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ABSTRACT  
This paper tests the performance of 2894 hedge funds in a time period that encompasses unambiguously bullish 
and bearish trends whose pivot is commonly set at March 2000. The database proves to be fairly trustable with 
respect to the most important biases in hedge funds studies, despite the high attrition rate of funds observed in 
the down market. An original ten-factor composite performance model is applied that achieves very high 
significance levels. The analysis of performance indicates that most hedge funds significantly outperformed the 
market during the whole test period, mostly thanks to the bullish subperiod. In contrast, no significant 
underperformance of individual hedge funds strategies is observed when markets headed south. The analysis of 
persistence yields very similar results, with most of the predictability being found among middle performers 
during the bullish period. However, the 'Market Neutral' strategy represents a remarkable exception, as 
abnormal performance is sustained throughout and significant persistence can be found between the 20% and 
69% best performers in this category, probably thanks to an extreme adaptability and a very active investment 
behaviour. 
KEY WORDS: Hedge funds, funds of funds, selection bias, abnormal returns, bullish market, bearish market, 
persistence 
1.    Introduction 
Since 1990, when around 2000 hedge funds were managing together assets of ca. $60 billion, the subsequent 
growth of number and asset base of hedge funds has never really been refuted. The industry only suffered from a 
relative slowdown in 1998, but has enjoyed since then a renewed vitality with an estimated size of 8400 funds 
managing $900 billion assets in 2004 (Van Hedge Funds Advisors International, 2002), corresponding to growth 
rates of respectively 10.8% and 21.3% respectively. 
The growing trend of the sector could be remarkably sustained during the stock market collapse that started in 
March 2000, when the NASDAQ Composite Index reached an all-time high of 5132, and finished three years 
later with a floor level at 1253. In the meantime, the global net asset value (NAV) of hedge funds continued to 
grow at a steady 10.6% (Van Hedge Funds Advisors International, 2002), contrasting with a decrease of 2.7% in 
worldwide mutual fund industry (Investment Company Institute, 2003). 
This relatively positive attitude of investors is typically motivated by the perceptions that hedge funds are largely 
market neutral, that their managers enjoy greater flexibility in their asset allocation that enables them to achieve 
a better market timing (Fung and Hsieh, 1997), or that hedge funds have a relatively low covariance with other 
classes of financial assets, making them a good diversification vehicle (Schneeweis and Spurgin, 1998; Capocci 
and Hiibner, 2001; Kat and Amin, 2003). 
The vast majority of performance studies on hedge funds has not focused on their behaviour under different 
market conditions. This is generally due to the particularly bullish period corresponding to the time window 
under review, as most empirical evidence reveals that data collected prior to 1994 by several data vendors 
displays a significant survivorship bias, as shown by Fung and Hsieh (2000), Liang (2000) and Capocci and 
Hiibner (2004). 
In this context, Ackermann et al. (1999) and Liang (1999) find that hedge funds constantly obtain better 
performance than mutual funds, although lower and more volatile than the reference market indices considered. 
On the other hand, the issue of persistence in performance is particularly important in the case of hedge funds 
because these funds experience a greater attrition rate than mutual funds (Brown et al, 1999, 2001; Liang, 1999). 
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Agarwal and Naik (2000) find evidence of persistence in hedge funds performance, while Capocci and Hiibner 
(2004) sustain that it can be mostly found among average performers and Brown et al. (1999) conclude that there 
is hardly any evidence of the existence of differential manager skills but persistence is rather due to style effects. 
Few authors have attempted to estimate the behaviour of hedge funds in bear markets. The periods under study 
do not favour this exercise, as periods of downward trends on the stock market were rare and discontinuous. For 
the period 1990-1998, Edwards and Caglayan (2001) find that only three hedge fund strategies (Market Neutral, 
Event Driven and Macro) provide protection to investors when stock markets head south. More recently, Ennis 
and Sebastian (2003) contend that in general, hedge funds did not provide investor protection after the market 
downturn of March 2000; rather, their superior performance is mostly due to the good market timing of their 
managers during the US stock market bubble that preceded it. 
This study benefits from the fact that stock markets have experienced a long period of depression, since stock 
indices had been almost continuously going down for a period of three years after March 2000. Thus, our 
analysis neither suffers from discontinuities between down periods, that preclude any analysis of persistence, nor 
from arbitrarily chosen definitions of a bear market, as Fabozzi and Francis (1979), Kao et al (1998), Rao 
(2001), Edwards and Caglayan (2001) and Liang (2003). 
In this paper, using a similar methodology as the one developed by Capocci and Hiibner (2004), we study the 
performance of hedge funds and its persistence during a time window that encompasses relatively long bullish 
and bearish periods. This paper introduces several key modifications with respect to the previous studies on 
hedge funds performance and persistence. Firstly, although Capocci and Hiibner (2004) and Liang (2001) 
consider a relatively short bearish subperiod with the Asian crisis, their sample does not enable them to 
distinguish between unambiguously bullish and bearish subperiods. Our study will thus identify and separately 
analyse two subperiods corresponding to upward and downward market trends, with a pivot set at the end of 
March 2000. 
Secondly, we introduce a modified asset pricing model encompassing the risk premia that proved to be relevant 
for assessing funds performance in previous studies, successively proposed by Fama and French (1993), Carhart 
(1997), Agarwal and Naik (2004) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004). This yields a model with 10 risk premia, 
which may look at first sight overspecified but one has to bear in mind that hedge funds families are very 
heterogeneous and, unlike mutual funds, involve investments in many types of assets and markets. 
Thirdly, we specifically identify one hedge fund strategy, namely Market Neutral that, following the results of 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001), supposedly hedges investors against bearish markets. It has also been studied in 
an unambiguously bullish setup by Capocci and Hiibner (2004), who find that this family of funds tends to out-
perform the market during the 1994-2000 period. In this paper, we perform an in-depth analysis of the level and 
persistence of its performance before and after the stock markets downturn. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the performance models we will use. In Section 3, we 
provide a thorough analysis of the database. The fourth section studies potential biases in the database. The next 
section reports the performance of hedge funds for the whole period and the subperiods considered. Section 6 
documents and explains the persistence in hedge fund returns over the same time windows, with a special focus 
on the Market Neutral strategy. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2.    Performance Measurement Models 
The starting point of our study of hedge funds performance is the original Sharpe (1964)-Lintner (1965) CAPM. 
As the basic multi-factor specification, we use the Carhart (1997) model as it is widely used in practice and it is 
not dominated by any other model in the mutual funds performance literature. Finally, we construct a multifactor 
model that extends the Carhart (1997) specification by combining it with factors proposed in Agarwal and Naik 
(2004) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) and by adding an additional factor. 
2.1   The Capital Asset Pricing model 
The first performance model we use is a single index model based on the classical CAPM developed by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965). Its equation to estimate is the following: 
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 (1) 
where RPt = return of fund P in month t; RFt = risk-free return on month t; RMt = return of the market portfolio on 
month t; εPt = error term; αP and βP are the intercept and the slope of the regression, respectively. 
The intercept of this equation, αp commonly called Jensen's alpha (1968) is usually interpreted as a measure of 
out- or under-performance relative to the market proxy used. 
2.2   The 4-factor Model of Carhart (1997) 
The four-factor model of Carhart (1997) is an extension of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. It 
takes into account size and book-to-market ratio, but also an additional factor for the momentum effect. Grinblatt 
et al. (1995) define this effect as buying stocks that were past winners and selling past losers. This model is 
estimated with the following regression: 
 
  (2) 
where SMBt = the factor-mimicking portfolio for size ('small minus big'), HMLt = the factor-mimicking portfolio 
for book-to-market equity ('high minus low')1 and PR1YRt = the factor-mimicking portfolio for the momentum 
effect.2 These factors aim at isolating the firm-specific components of returns. 
2.3   The Composite Model 
In order to take into account the complex characteristics of the hedge fund industry, we implement a combination 
and an extension of Carhart's (1997) four-factor model, the model used by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and the one 
used by Capocci and Hiibner (2004). This model contains the market risk premium, Fama and French (1993) 
'size' and 'value' factors, Carhart's (1997) 'momentum' factor, five factors introduced by Agarwal and Naik 
(2004): a factor for non-US equities investing funds (MSCI World excluding US), two factors to account for the 
fact that hedge funds invest in US and foreign bond indices3 (Lehman High Yield Bond Index and Salomon 
World Government Bond Index) and one factor that Capocci and Hiibner (2004) proved to be highly significant, 
the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index, and finally a commodity factor (GSCI Commodity Index). 
Furthermore, we add an additional bond index factor that is not used in previous studies, namely the Lehman 
Mortgage-Backed Securities Index to take into account the fact that various hedge funds strategies (fixed income 
arbitrage, mortgage-backed securities) are exposed to this market, and the Lehman High-Yield Credit Bond 
Index. 
The market proxy used is the value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks market proxy that 
is usually used in mutual funds performance studies. 
Several additional factors, such as the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, the Lehman BAA Corporate Bond Index 
and the Salomon Brothers Government and Corporate Bond Index proposed by Agarwal and Naik (2004) and 
Capocci and Hiibner (2004) and the Gold index used by Fung and Hsieh (1997) were not included in our 
extended model given their high colinearity with our set of indices.4 
(3) 
where RMt = return on the Russel 3000 Index; MSWXUSt = return of the MSCI World Index excluding US; 
SWGBIt = return of the Salomon World Government Bond Index; JPMEMBIt = return of the JP Morgan 
Emerging Market Bond Index; HYt = return of the Lehman High Yield Credit Bond Index; MORTt = return of 
the Lehman Mortgage-Backed Securities Index; and GSCIt = return of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. 
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3.    Data 
3.1   Database 
Three main hedge fund databases are available for empirical studies: 'Managed Account Reports' (MAR), 'Hedge 
Fund Research, Inc.' (HFR), and 'TASS Management' (TASS) (Amin and Kat, 2003). These databases are the 
most used in academic and commercial hedge fund studies.5 Data vendors do not only collect performance data. 
For a majority of funds, they record other useful information such as company name, start and ending date, 
strategy followed, assets under management, management and incentive fees, manager's name etc. There is no 
consensus on the definition of the strategy followed but there are similarities. MAR defines nine strategies with a 
total of 16 substrategies. HFR defines 16 different strategies in two categories, 12 non-directional and five 
directional strategies, plus the Funds of Funds and the Sector categories. Finally, TASS defines 15 strategies. 
We use hedge fund data from MAR, as in Fung and Hsieh (1997), Schneeweis and Spurgin (1998), and Amin 
and Kat (2003). The database gives monthly net-of-fee individual returns and other information on individual 
funds and groups them in indices. We use 108 monthly returns on 2894 individual hedge funds plus 48 indices 
(16 investment styles with 3 indices for each investment style: onshore, offshore and a combined index). These 
funds include 1622 funds alive at the end of the period (56%) and 1272 dissolved funds (44%). 
Hedge funds are classified in two categories. The Individual Funds category features 13 strategies: Event driven 
- Risk Arbitrage, Event-Driven - Distressed Securities, Global, Global Est., Global Intern., Global Emerging, US 
Opp.,6 Macro, Market Neutral, Long Only Leveraged, Sector, Short Sales and No Category, the latter one 
corresponding to funds with no stated strategy and funds whose strategy does not fill in any of the above. The 
Funds of Funds category features 3 strategies: Niche, Diversified and Others. 
We take the value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks market proxy that is usually used in 
mutual funds performance studies (Fama and French, 1993, 1996; Carhart, 1997). Its almost perfectly correlation 
with the Russell 3000 index used in Agarwal and Naik (2004) suggests that both market proxies are very 
similar.7 Finally, the one-month T-bill rate from Ibbotson Associates is taken as the risk-free rate. 
3.2   Basic Performance 
Panel A of Table 1a contains descriptive statistics of the funds, whether living or dead, in our database. These 
hedge funds data are contrasted against the descriptive statistics of the factors introduced in equation (3) of 
Section 2. These statistics are reported in panel B of Table lb. 
Panel A shows that the highest mean return was achieved by the Sector (1.66%), then the Global Est. (1.29%) 
and Global Emerging (1.17%) follow. Average returns of Funds of Funds are all around 0.70%, only followed by 
the Global (0.45%) strategy that achieves the lowest mean return. This pattern is similar for the mean excess 
returns. These descriptive statistics differ from the results obtained by Capocci and Hiibner (2004) for the 1994-
2000 period, who find that the best performers are US Opportunistics Small Caps, US Opportunistics Growth 
and Sector while the worst average performers are Foreign Exchange, Short Sales and the Funds of Funds, 
without substrategy. This difference can be explained by the difference in the database used (MAR combined 
with HFR for Capocci and Hiibner, 2004) and the different time period studied. 
The Sharpe measure (the ratio of excess return and standard deviation) offers a much different picture: 
accounting for risk, Market Neutral funds appear to be the best performers, while the funds that achieve the 
highest absolute returns are only among the average risk-adjusted performers. 
A look at the t-stats indicates that mean returns are significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level for 
all funds and that the mean excess returns are significantly positive for all cases but the Global and Diversified 
funds of funds categories. 
Panel B of Table 1 a shows that the mean excess return of the Market Proxy is 0.78% per month (about 9.5% per 
year), only statistically different from zero at the 10% level. This reasonable value indicates that the bullish 
subperiod has been almost totally offset by the market correction. 
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Table la. Descriptive statistics of hedge funds strategies and passive investment strategies - Panel A: Hedge fund strategies January 1994-December 2002 (108 months)* 




% of the 
category 



















Individual funds                 
Event driven-Risk Arb 136 6.1% 4.7% 85 51 0.93% 5.15 1.74% 0.92% -6.4% 5.5% -0.58 2.24 0.55% 3.05 0.32 
Event driven-Distressed Sec 106 4.7% 3.7% 70 42 0.99% 5.48 2.25% 1.17% -10.8% 7.0% -1.16 6.25 0.61% 3.38 0.27 
Global** 175 7.8% 6.0% 1 174 0.45% 2.47 3.80% 0.64% -25.8% 13.6% -2.74 21.61 0.07% 0.37 0.02 
Global Est. 499 22.2% 17.2% 300 199 1.29% 7.15 3.25% 1.09% -9.9% 12.3% 0.11 1.59 0.91% 5.04 0.28 
Global Intern. 72 3.2% 2.5% 46 26 0.88% 4.87 2.42% 0.93% -6.8% 8.9% 0.24 1.44 0.50% 2.77 0.21 
Global Emerging 157 7.0% 5.4% 97 60 1.17% 6.48 5.02% 1.80% -21.7% 14.3% -0.66 3.18 0.79% 4.37 0.16 
US Opp.*** 39 1.7% 1.3% 0 39 0.23% 1.30 2.40% 0.21% -5.6% 7.4% 0.09 0.70 -0.18% -1.00 -0.08 
Macro 144 6.4% 4.9% 52 92 0.82% 4.52 2.15% 0.61% -4.1% 7.0% 0.45 0.57 0.44% 2.42 0.20 
Market Neutral 635 28.3% 21.9% 385 250 1.04% 5.73 0.97% 1.05% -2.5% 4.0% -0.22 1.05 0.66% 3.62 0.67 
Long Only Lev. 33 1.5% 1.1% 16 17 0.92% 5.06 5.83% 1.50% -17.4% 13.3% -0.44 0.16 0.54% 2.96 0.09 
Sector 190 8.5% 6.6% 111 79 1.66% 9.17 4.43% 2.07% -13.1% 19.9% 0.31 2.74 1.28% 7.06 0.29 
Short Sales 37 1.6% 1.3% 24 13 0.88% 4.87 4.48% 0.67% -13.6% 13.2% 0.09 0.74 0.50% 2.76 0.11 
No Category 24 1.1% 0.8% 6 18 0.93% 5.12 3.45% 0.58% -7.8% 12.7% 1.17 3.20 0.55% 3.01 0.16 
Individual Funds Total 2247 100% 78% 1186 1061 1.08% 5.98 2.28% 1.11% -8.6% 8.0% -0.26 2.77 0.70% 3.87 0.31 
Funds of Funds                 
Niche 114 18% 4% 86 28 0.74% 4.10 1.33% 0.67% -4.1% 5.1% 0.22 1.73 0.36% 1.99 0.27 
Diversified 501 77% 17% 349 152 0.71% 3.95 1.87% 0.75% -7.3% 7.0% -0.12 3.54 0.26% 1.41 0.14 
Other 32 5% 1% 1 31 0.77% 4.27 1.69% 0.80% -7.3% 5.8% -0.89 4.86 0.39% 2.16 0.23 
Funds of Funds Total 647 100% 22% 436 211 0.72% 3.96 1.77% 0.71% -6.8% 6.6% -0.11 3.34 0.34% 1.85 0.19 
Hedge Funds Total 2894 100% 100% 1622 1272 0.99% 5.49 2.14% 1.11% -8.2% 7.6% -0.2368 3.04 0.61% 3.38 0.29 
*This table shows the mean returns, t-stat for mean = 0, standard deviation, medians, minimum, maximum, mean excess returns, t-stat for mean excess return = 0, and Sharpe ratios for the individual hedge funds in our 
MAR database for the whole period 01:1994-12:2002. US Opp. Funds ended in 01:1999. Sharpe ratio is the ratio of excess return and standard deviation with a risk-free rate set at 5%. In Panel A, No of Fds represent 
the number of funds following a particular strategy (or substrategy), Living Funds and Dead Funds represents the number of surviving and dead funds (in December 2002). We calculate the Mean Excess Return 
considering Ibbotson Associates one-month T-bills. Numbers in the table are monthly percentage. 
**The Global category has been gradually suppressed and replaced by the Global Est., Global Intern. And Global Emerging categories. Therefore, the funds disappearance is mostly due to category transfers. ***US 
Opportunistics ended in 1999. 
Published in : The European Journal of Finance, 2005, vol. 11, n°5, 361-392 
Status : Author’s post-print version 
 
Table 1b. Descriptive statistics of hedge funds strategies and passive investment strategies - Panel B: Passive Strategies* 
 Panel B 
 Mean 
return 
t (mean) Std. dev. Median Min Max Mean exc. return t (mean exc.) 
Sharpe 
ratio 
Equity          
Market Proxy 0.78 1.70 4.77 1.58 -15.7 8.3 0.41 0.90 0.19 
MSCI World          
Excluding US 0.09 0.22 4.36 0.47 -12.9 10.3 -0.28 -0.67 -0.15 
F&F SMB Factor 0.02 0.04 4.45 -0.36 -16.3 21.4 -0.35 -0.82 -0.18 
F&F HML Factor 0.60 1.50 4.16 0.68 -8.9 13.7 0.23 0.58 0.14 
Momentum Factor 1.14 2.06 5.74 1.27 -25.1 18.2 0.77 1.39 0.24 
Bond          
1 month T-bill 0.37 34.69 0.11 0.40 0.1 0.6 NA NA NA 
Salomon WBGI 0.50 2.83 1.83 0.24 -3.4 5.9 0.13 0.72 0.39 
JPM EMBI Global 0.82 1.81 4.67 1.16 -24.2 10.9 0.44 0.99 0.21 
Lehman Mortgage 0.59 6.94 0.89 0.66 -2.6 3.2 0.22 2.66 2.99 
Lehman High Yield Credit 
0.40 1.99 2.11 0.66 -7.37 7.49 0.03 0.17 0.08 
Commodity          
Goldman Sachs Commodity 
0.59 1.14 5.35 0.61 -12.28 15.79 0.22 1.07 0.20 
*This table shows the mean returns, t-stat for mean = 0, standard deviation, medians, minimum, maximum, mean excess returns, t-stat for mean excess return = 0, and Sharpe ratios for the individual hedge funds in our 
MAR database for the whole period 01:1994-12:2002. US Opp. Funds ended in 01:1999. Sharpe ratio is the ratio of excess return and standard deviation with a risk-free rate set at 5%. In Panel A, No of Fds represent 
the number of funds following a particular strategy (or substrategy), Living Funds and Dead Funds represents the number of surviving and dead funds (in December 2002). We calculate the Mean Excess Return 
considering Ibbotson Associates one-month T-bills. Numbers in the table are monthly percentage. 
 
Published in : The European Journal of Finance, 2005, vol. 11, n°5, 361-392 
Status : Author’s post-print version 
 
The mean excess premium of the MSCI World excluding US is an insignificant 0.22% per month. The average 
SMB and HML returns are insignificant; only the Momentum factor, with the highest mean, provides a 
significantly positive value. The highest mean return for bond indices is obtained by the JP Morgan Emerging 
Market Bond Index. The Sharpe ratio obtained by our whole hedge fund database (0.29) is higher than the ones 
for the Market Proxy (0.19), and higher than for the MSCI World Excluding US (-0.15). 
3.3   Analysis per Subperiods 
The cutting point chosen for the identification of the up and down periods has been set at March 2000. This 
month corresponds to the maximum observed value of the Russell 3000 Index that reached a value of 858.48 
during the session of 24 March 2000. During the up period, the monthly index return was positive in 70% of the 
months (52 out of 74) with an average yearly return of 19.4%. During the down period, the monthly index return 
was positive in 39% of the months (12 out of 34) and the average yearly return was -16.9%. Those trends are 
sufficiently strong to allow us to consider both subperiods as, respectively, bullish and bearish without having to 
use a complex rule to separate bullish, bearish and neutral months since these rules would probably not match 
the ones used by funds managers for their market timing decisions. 
The analysis of basic performance for the two subperiods under study, presented in Table 2, reveals some 
interesting differences. 
Table 2 displays summary results for the bullish and bearish subperiods. As expected from the nature of the time 
windows, excess returns obtained for the majority of hedge funds strategies are mostly due to the bullish 
subperiod, with the best performers before March 2000 also displaying the worst returns after the market reversal 
took place. There are three noticeable exceptions. Firstly, the US Opportunistics strategy does poorly in spite of 
favourable market conditions, which explains the disappearance of this category. Secondly, the Global strategy 
seems to achieve returns that are much less dependent on the conjuncture than the other strategies. Finally, the 
Short Sales strategy is the only one that records significant excess returns during bad times but at the expense of 
insignificant returns in good times. 
Preliminary evidence does not seem to indicate that the behaviour of the two Event Driven and of the Macro 
strategies outperform the other ones in the bearish period, while the returns of the Market Neutral strategy are 
then significant but not when excess returns are considered. Although further evidence is obviously needed, this 
does not support the findings of Edwards and Caglayan (2001) with a different definition of bearish market 
conditions. 
For our factors, the same analysis shows that the Market and Momentum factors give the highest excess returns 
during the first subperiod, while the Book-to-Market and Lehman Mortgage factors obtain significant positive 
abnormal returns during the second one. Poorest performers are the Lehman Aggregate US Bond Index during 
the up market trend period and the Market and World Excluding US factors during the down period.8 
3.4   Correlations 
The traditional hedge funds literature contends that, thanks to their weak correlation between hedge funds and 
other securities, hedge funds are likely to improve to the risk-return trade-off when added to a traditional 
portfolio (Fung and Hsieh, 1997; Schneeweis and Spurgin, 1998; Liang, 1999; Amin and Kat, 2003). This 
subsection studies the ranges of correlation coefficients among and between hedge funds and passive investment 
strategies. The correlations have been computed for the whole 1994-2002 period and for two subperiods. In 
order to obtain periods with comparable lengths, we took the bearish subperiod starting in April 2000 (33 
months) and matched it against the most bullish time window, that started in September 1998 (19 months) rather 
than the whole 1994-03:2000 period. Because of the extremely large number of results to be reported, we chose 
to report ranges in correlations. Results are reported in Table 3a-c. 
In each cell, correlations increase as the color is darker. The upper part of the cell accounts for the correlation 
during the whole period, while the lower part is split between the pre- and post-March 2000 subperiods. 
Panel A reports correlations among hedge funds strategies. As typically reported (Liang, 2003; Capocci and 
Hübner, 2004) in the literature, these strategies are in general highly correlated when indices are considered, with 
the exception of the Short Sales strategy that systematically goes conversely - as expected. However, a closer 
look at their evolution over time indicates that the Global and, to a lesser extent, the Global International 
strategies tend to decrease their correlation with other funds in bearish times; on the other hand, the Global  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of hedge funds strategies for the bullish and bearish subperiods 
 Subperiod 01:1994-03:2000 Subperiod 04:2000-12:2002 






















Individual Funds             
Event driven-Risk Arb 113 89 24 1.23%*** 0.82%*** 0.46 112 85 27 0.25% -0.06% -0.04 
Event driven-Dist. Sec 83 65 18 1.27%*** 0.85%*** 0.36 94 70 24 0.37% 0.06% 0.03 
Global 175 6 169 0.57%** 0.16% 0.04 6 0 6 0.16% -0.14% -0.05 
Global Est. 400 342 58 1.96%*** 1.54%*** 0.48 441 300 141 -0.21% -0.52%** -0.19 
Global Intern. 64 58 6 1.30%*** 0.89%*** 0.35 66 46 20 -0.08% -0.39% -0.22 
Global Emerging 132 108 24 1.57%*** 1.16%*** 0.21 133 97 36 0.27% -0.04% -0.01 
US Opp. 39 0 39 0.23% -0.18% -0.08 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Macro 121 63 58 1.10%*** 0.68%*** 0.30 86 52 34 0.19% -0.12% -0.07 
Market Neutral 487 350 137 1.18%*** 0.77%*** 0.75 498 385 113 0.71%*** 0.40% 0.52 
Long Only Lev. 31 22 9 1.83%*** 1.42%*** 0.26 24 16 8 -1.17%*** -1.48%*** -0.23 
Sector 147 126 21 2.56%*** 2.14%*** 0.50 169 111 58 -0.38% -0.69%** -0.16 
Short Sales 34 25 9 0.39%* -0.02% 0.00 28 24 4 1.99%*** 1.68%*** 0.33 
No Category 19 9 10 1.21%*** 0.80%*** 0.20 14 6 8 0.28% -0.03% -0.01 
Individual Funds Total 1845 1263 582 1.47%*** 1.06%*** 0.45 1665 1186 479 0.19% -0.12% -0.06 
Funds of Funds             
Niche 81 57 24 0.92%*** 0.51%** 0.35 90 86 4 0.33% 0.03% 0.03 
Diversified 408 333 75 0.96%*** 0.26% 0.12 416 349 77 0.15% -0.16% -0.13 
Other 31 18 13 0.92%*** 0.50%** 0.26 19 1 18 0.44%* 0.14% 0.14 
Funds of Funds Total 520 408 112 0.95%*** 0.54%** 0.28 535 436 99 0.18% -0.13% -0.11 
Hedge funds Total 2365 1671 694 1.35%*** 0.93%*** 0.42 2214 1622 578 0.19% -0.12% -0.07 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
This table shows the number of funds following a particular strategy (or substrategy), the corresponding number of living and dead funds, mean returns, mean excess returns, and Sharpe ratios for the individual hedge 
funds in our MAR database for the subperiods 01:1994-03:2000 (bullish) and 04:2000-12:2002 (bearish). Sharpe ratio is the ratio of excess return and standard deviation with a risk-free rate set at 5%. 
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Emerging strategy follows the other strategies more closely during periods of down markets. The No Category 
and Niche strategies seem to be more correlated with the rest of hedge funds in the subperiods than in the full 
period. In Panel B, the behaviour of our explanatory variables is also of considerable interest. Only four indices 
(Market, World Excluding US, SMB and Lehman High Yield) have a high correlation with most hedge funds 
strategies. These results confirm that hedge funds strategies are weakly correlated with most traditional 
investment tools. 
The first line indicates that almost all hedge funds strategies tend to follow the market (US and international) 
more closely in the bearish subperiod. This strong tendency is not invalidated for the supposedly investor-
protecting strategies. In general, hedge funds strategies sharply decrease and even reverse their loading with the 
momentum factor, as they become momentum-contrarian during bad times. They also reduce their sensitivity 
towards the Emerging Market Bond factor, while increasing their exposure to the Lehman High Yield and the 
SMB factors. The Short Sales strategy, for its part, noticeably switches from a 'Glamour' strategy (low loading 
with the HML factor) to a 'Value' one in the last subperiod. This is the only strategy that consistently invests in 
Value stocks in bearish markets. 
Panel C indicates that the correlation coefficients of our regressors are low enough to raise serious 
multicolinearity concerns. 
Table 3a. Correlation among hedge funds, between hedge funds and passive investment strategies, and among 
passive investment strategies - Panel A: Correlation among hedge funds strategies 
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Table 3b, c. Correlation among hedge funds, between hedge funds and passive investment strategies, and among 
passive investment strategies - Panel B: Correlation between Hedge Funds strategies and Passive Investments 
strategies; Panel C: Correlation among Passive Investment strategies 
 
This table reports the ranges of correlation coefficient among hedge funds strategies (Panel A), between hedge funds strategies and passive 
investment strategies (Panel B) and among passive investment strategies (Panel C). For each pair of strategies (in line and in column), the 
upper rectangle of the cell represents the range of correlation coefficient for the whole period (01:1994-12:2002); the bottom left square 
represents the range of correlation coefficient for the most bullish subperiod (09:1998-03:2000); and the bottom right square represents the 
range of correlation coefficient for the most bearish subperiod (04:2000-12:2002). Color codes for correlations are: >75% in black ( ), 
between 50 and 75% in dark grey ( ), between 25 and 50% in medium-dark grey ( ), between 0 and 25% in medium grey ( ), between —
25 and 0% in light grey ( ) and < — 25% in white ( ). ERA = Event Driven - Risk Arbitrage, EDS = Event Driven - Distressed Securities, 
GLB = Global, GES = Global Established, GIN = Globla International, GEM = Global Emerging, MAC = Macro, MKN = Market Neutral, 
LOL = Long Only Leveraged, SEC = Sectors, SHS = Short Sales, OPP, NOC = No Category, NIC = Niche, DIV = Diversified, MKT = 
Market Proxy, WXU = World excluding US, MOM = Momentum, SWG = Salomon World Government Bond Index, EMB = JP Morgan 
Emerging Market Bond Index, MOR = Lehman Mortgage Index, HIY = Lehman High Yield Index and GSC = Goldman Sachs Commodity 
Index. The US Opportunistics and Other strategies were not included as they do not encompass the whole period. 
4.    Analysis of Biases 
4.1   Survivorship Bias 
In order to reduce the severity of survivorship bias, an important concern for mutual funds (Carhart, 1997) as 
well as hedge funds studies (Ackermann et al., 1999; Fung and Hsieh, 2000), data vendors backfill each fund's 
performance history prior to their addition to the database. Thus, they provide data that go back before the 
starting date of the database itself, usually 1993. However, before this starting date, one is left with only 
surviving funds data. Brown et al. (2001), for the TASS database, and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) for the 
combined MAR and HFR databases have shown that data for the pre-1994 period is indeed subject to non-
negligible survivorship bias that is very likely to hinder statistical inference (Hendricks et al, 1993). Data starting 
in 1994 appears to be more reliable according to this criterion (Capocci and Hiibner, 2004). 
Two definitions of this bias are commonly used in mutual and hedge fund studies: the performance difference 
between surviving and dissolved funds (Ackermann et al, 1999) and the performance difference between living 
and all funds (Liang, 2000). 
We report the bias using both definitions for the whole period and for two subperiods 1994-03: 2000 and 
04:2000-2002. 
In Panel A of Table 4a, we report the yearly returns of all funds, surviving funds and dissolved funds. Hedge 
funds experience extremely high returns in 1999, when the stock market experienced a sharp positive return, 
without great difference between surviving and dissolved funds. In the subsequent years, returns gradually 
reduced but mostly due to the negative returns of dissolved funds. This is a clear effect of the bearish turn of the 
market after March 2000, leading to an increase in differences in hedge funds returns between the best and the 
worst performing managers. 
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Table 4a. Survivorship bias in hedge funds - Panel A: Annual performance (all funds, surviving funds and 
dissolved funds) 
Panel A 
 All Funds Surviving Funds Dissolved Funds 
Year Return S.D. Obs. Return S.D. Obs. Return S.D. Obs. 
1994 1.81% 1.59% 8601 2.97% 1.38% 3419 1.03% 1.79% 5182 
1995 18.64% 0.97% 10641 19.89% 1.02% 4630 17.65% 0.96% 6011 
1996 21.29% 1.44% 13049 23.57% 1.29% 6200 19.25% 1.57% 6849 
1997 20.40% 2.04% 15860 22.39% 1.89% 8136 18.32% 2.21% 7724 
1998 3.59% 3.18% 17872 4.42% 3.03% 9954 2.58% 3.38% 7918 
1999 33.46% 2.45% 18798 33.79% 2.21% 12052 33.29% 2.93% 6746 
2000 9.62% 2.91% 20221 14.42% 2.34% 14395 -2.28% 4.34% 5826 
2001 5.71% 1.62% 20591 8.00% 1.39% 16706 -3.17% 2.59% 3885 
2002 0.43% 1.26% 20771 1.17% 1.21% 18899 -4.89% 1.99% 1872 
Mean 01:94-03:00 0.17 1.95% 14137 0.18 1.80% 7399 0.15 2.14% 6738 
Mean 04:00-12:02 0.05 1.93% 20528 0.08 1.65% 16667 -0.03 2.97% 3861 
Mean 94-02 0.13 1.94% 16267 0.15 1.75% 10488 0.09 2.42% 5779 
See Table 4b, c notes. 
 
Table 4b, c. Survivorship bias in hedge funds - Panel B: Living - Dead Funds; Panel C: Living -All Funds 
Panel B Panel C 
Year Return Year Return 
1994 0.02 1994 0.01 
1995 0.02 1995 0.01 
1996 0.04 1996 0.02 
1997 0.04 1997 0.02 
1998 0.02 1998 0.01 
1999 0.01 1999 0.00 
2000 0.17 2000 0.05 
2001 0.11 2001 0.02 
2002 0.06 2002 0.01 
Bias 01:94-03:00 0.16 per Month Bias 1/94-3/00 0.09 per Month 
 1.92 per Year  1.03 per Year 
Bias 04:00-12:02 0.98 per Month Bias 4/00-12/02 0.22 per Month 
 11.75  per Year  2.61 per Year 
Bias 94-02 0.41  per Month Bias 1/94-12/02 0.13 per Month 
 4.93  per Year  1.51 per Year 
This table reports the survivorship bias of calculated from our database. Our MAR database contains 2894 hedge funds, including 1622 
survived funds and 1272 dissolved funds as of December 2002. In Panel B survivorship bias is calculated as the performance difference 
between surviving funds and dissolved funds. In Panel C survivorship bias is calculated as the performance difference between surviving 
funds and all funds. All returns are net of fees. Numbers in the table are yearly percentage unless otherwise indicated. 
 
In Panel B, our results yield a monthly survivorship bias of 0.41% (or 4.92% per annum) for the whole period 
using the first formula while in Panel C the bias of 0.13% per month (1.51% per annum) with the second 
formula. This latter value is much higher than the very low value obtained by Ackermann et al. for the period 
1988-1995. It is similar to the percentage of 1.5% from Fung and Hsieh (1998), lower than the 0.30% monthly 
bias found by Fung and Hsieh (2000) and slightly higher than the percentage of 1.2% found by Capocci and 
Hübner (2004) for the 1994-2000 period. It is however lower than the 3% bias found by Liang (2001), which is 
also the industry consensus as stressed by Amin and Kat (2003).9 
A look at subperiod biases indicates that the level of this bias is mostly due to the bearish period, where its level 
sets at 2.61%. The bias drifts up through the very high level of returns differential between surviving and 
dissolved funds, but this effect is somehow mitigated by the decrease in the proportion of returns from dissolved 
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funds in the database (this proportion steadily decreases from 35.9% in 1999 to 9.1% in 2002). Thanks to this 
bias-reduction effect of recent data, the global behaviour of the database in relationship to survivorship bias is 
kept within reasonable bounds. 
4.2   Instant Return History Bias 
As hedge funds are not allowed to advertise, their managers consider inclusion in a database primarily as a 
marketing tool. This creates a positive instant history bias or backfilled bias (Fung and Hsieh, 2000) that occurs 
because a fund's performance history is backfilled after inclusion. The upward bias results from the likelihood 
that funds with a poor track record are less likely to apply for inclusion than funds with good performance 
history. 
We use the same two-step methodology as Park (1995), Brown et al. (2001), and Fung and Hsieh (2000) to 
estimate this bias for our hedge fund database. On the one hand, we estimate the average monthly return of the 
'observable portfolio' which invests in all funds from our database each month. On the other hand, we estimate 
the average monthly return of the 'adjusted observable portfolio' obtained from investing in all these funds after 
deleting the first 12,24 and, if possible, 36, 48 and 60 months of returns. The bias is estimated for the whole 
period and for the bullish and bearish subperiods in order to compare our results with those obtained by Fung 
and Hsieh (2000) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004). Results are reported in Table 5. 
For the whole period, the observable monthly return averaged 0.99%, while the adjusted observable one was 
0.88% (when deleting the 12 first months), 0.84% (24 months), 0.81% (36 and 48 months), and 0.80% (60 
months). This gives an estimate of 1.32% per year, very much in line with the values of 1.4% found by Fung and 
Hsieh (2000) and 1.2% found by Capocci and Hiibner (2004). 
Contrarily to the analysis of the survivorship bias, the first subperiod is mostly responsible for the level of the 
bias. Because the period was increasingly bullish, with the highest returns being obtained around the end of the 
period, the bias starts at a fairly high level and increases as more returns are removed from the estimation, 
consistently with the phenomenon found by Capocci and Hübner (2004). For the 'bearish' subperiod, only partial 
results are available due to the small length of this period, but the bias is kept at very reasonable levels. 
Table 5. Estimation of instant return history bias 





Av. Nb of Fds 
Period 94-02     
All 0.99% NA NA 1356 
Without 12M 0.88% 0.11% 1.32% 1174 
Without 24M 0.84% 0.15% 1.80% 999 
Without 36M 0.81% 0.18% 2.16% 837 
Without 48M 0.81% 0.18% 2.16% 694 
Without 60M 0.80% 0.19% 2.28% 570 
Subperiod 01:94-03:00     
All 1.35% NA NA 1197 
Without 12M 1.22% 0.13% 1.56% 945 
Without 24M 1.18% 0.17% 2.04% 752 
Without 36M 1.14% 0.21% 2.52% 620 
Without 48M 1.14% 0.21% 2.52% 539 
Without 60M 1.13% 0.23% 2.76% 498 
Subperiod 04:00-12:02     
All 0.19% NA NA 1715 
Without 12M 0.10% 0.09% 1.08% 1489 
Without 24M 0.08% 0.11% 1.32% 1256 
This table reports the instant history bias calculated from our database. Our MAR database contains 2894 hedge funds, including 1622 
survived funds and 1272 dissolved funds as of December 2002. Instant history bias is calculated as the performance difference between the 
average monthly return using the portfolio which invests in all funds each month (the observable portfolio) and the average monthly return 
from investing in these funds after deleting the first 12, 24, 36 and 60 months of returns (the adjusted observable portfolio). All returns are 
net of fees and on a monthly basis unless otherwise indicated. 
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One may relate the level of this bias to the one of survivorship bias in this context: during unfavourable market 
conditions, there is a sharp difference in the returns between surviving and dissolved funds that can be explained 
by attrition of the latter funds because of their bad performance. As only the most successful funds tend to 
remain during this time period, the corresponding instant history bias is likely to be mitigated by this self-
selection of the most successful managers towards the end of the period, while the observable portfolio returns 
include returns from subsequently dissolved funds. 
4.3   Conclusions 
Overall, this examination of biases indicates that both survivorship and instant history biases are kept to very 
reasonable levels for the whole period as well as for the bullish and bearish subperiods, but for very different 
reasons. Interestingly, survivorship bias is higher for the period of down market, while there is evidence of a 
more important instant history bias during the upward trending period. 
One could have suspected that the high failure rate of hedge funds after March 2000 would have lead 
survivorship bias to suspiciously high levels, but this is avoided by the particular behaviour of the database, and 
especially thanks to the increase in the number of funds that has been observed over the same time window. Yet, 
the phenomenon of elimination of the poorest performers under unfavourable market conditions is also 
responsible for the remarkably low level of the instant history bias. 
5.    Hedge Funds Performance 
This section aims at studying whether hedge funds, as a whole or strategy by strategy, have significantly out-
performed the market. We compute all estimations by using Newey-West standard errors to adjust for any 
autocorrelation in the returns. 
Table 6 reports the results for Individual Funds and Funds of Funds, and all funds strategies, with equally 
weighted portfolio excess returns for each investment style. The model is also estimated for each fund 
individually.10 To analyse hedge funds performance in more details, the last columns give the distribution of 
individually estimated alphas per strategy, with the percentage of significantly positive, insignificant and 
negative alphas at the 5% level. 
5.1   Performance Measurement using the CAPM 
Panel A of Table 6a, b reports performance estimates using the CAPM. The estimated betas are rather low, 
except for the Long Only Leveraged, and all R-squared are below 60%, except for Long Only Leveraged and 
Global Est., suggesting the need to use a more detailed model. Overall, two-thirds of the individual funds 
strategies produce significantly positive alphas, while the two Funds of Funds strategies outperform the market 
at the 10% level. Overall, hedge funds as a whole also significantly outperform the market at the 1 % level. 
Taken individually, 32% of the alphas are significantly positive.  
5.2    Performance Measurement Using Multi-factor Models 
It is presumably better to use a multi-factor model to account for all possible investment strategies. In Panel B of 
Table 6a, b, we report the results for Carhart's 4-factor model and in Panel C the results for our combined model 
applied to hedge funds. 
Panel B reveals that the premium on the SMB factor is, in almost all cases, significant, including in the Short 
Sales strategy where it is negative. The coefficients of the HML and Momentum factors are significant for four 
and six individual funds strategies, respectively, and to all funds of funds strategies. 
Panel C shows that the explanatory power of the HML factor seems marginal as only three betas are significantly 
positive at the 5% level. The Momentum factor remains a stronger indicator of hedge funds behaviour, with only 
the Short Sales strategy being momentum-contrarian over the whole period. The results with our combined 
model also indicate that all additional factors add explanatory power to the regression. In particular, as already 
outlined by Capocci and Hübner (2004), the Emerging Bond factor adds explanatory power in more than 50% of 
the strategies with high significance levels. Event Driven strategies are more prone to bear a high exposure to 
high yield bond factors, while Global International and Emerging strategies share similar risk exposure 
characteristics except that the former is more momentum-driven and the latter is naturally heavily exposed to the 
Emerging Market Bond factor. 
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Table 6a, b. Performance measurement using the CAPM, Carhart's four-factor model and the combined model - Panel A: Single index model; Panel B: Carhart's 4-factor 
model 
 Panel A Panel B 
    Alpha distrib.       Alpha distrib. 
 Alpha Mkt 
R2 
adj 
+ 0 - Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR 
R2 
adj 
+ 0 - 
Individual funds                
Event driven - Risk Arb 0.46%*** 0.26*** 0.515 48% 51% 0% 0.41%*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 0.08*** -0.01 0.674 37% 60% 1% 
Event driven - Dist. Sec 0.50%*** 0.30*** 0.410 34% 64% 1% 0.41%*** 0.33*** 0.23*** 0.11 *** 0.01 0.606 26% 71% 2% 
Global -0.11% 0.47*** 0.331 9% 78% 11% -0.19% 0.48*** 0.19*** 0.08 0.02 0.364 11% 77% 11% 
Global Est. 0.69%*** 0.58*** 0.719 30% 67% 2% 0.58%*** 0.58*** 0.26*** 0.04 0.07*** 0.872 27% 71% 1% 
Global Intern. 0.37%** 0.34*** 0.449 22% 74% 2% 0.24% 0.38*** 0.15*** 0.09** 0.05* 0.543 21% 71% 7% 
Global Emerging 0.55% 0.62*** 0.337 20% 75% 4% 0.43% 0.64*** 0.31*** 0.12 0.02 0.397 18% 78% 3% 
US Opp. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA*** NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Macro 0.32%** 0.30*** 0.445 18% 72% 8% 0.16% 0.33*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.11*** 0.631 17% 74% 8% 
Market Neutral 0.62%*** 0.12*** 0.378 44% 52% 2% 0.55%*** 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.01 0.554 41% 54% 3% 
Long Only Lev. 0.12% 1.05*** 0.730 9% 80% 9% 0.13% 0.98*** 0.39*** -0.02 0.02 0.816 12% 80% 6% 
Sector 0.99%*** 0.73*** 0.619 31% 67% 1% 0.81%*** 0.71 *** 0.43*** 0.01 0.15*** 0.873 26% 72% 1% 
Short Sales 0.81%*** 
-
0.74*** 
0.607 11% 88% 0% 0.83%*** -0.66*** -0.36*** 0.09 -0.09** 0.778 20% 79% 0% 
No Category 0.43% 0.31*** 0.174 21% 78% 0% 0.26% 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.01 0.14*** 0.357 21% 73% 4% 
Individual Funds Total 0.55%*** 0.39*** 0.651 31% 65% 3% 0.46%*** 0.40*** 0.20*** 0.06** 0.05*** 0.828 28% 67% 3% 
Funds of Funds                
Niche 0.31%*** 0.15*** 0.285 43% 53% 2% 0.21%** 0.18*** nil *** 0.07** 0.04** 0.454 33% 62% 3% 
Diversified 0.24%* 0.26*** 0.427 33% 62% 3% 0.10% 0.29*** 0.16*** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.644 25% 68% 5% 
Other NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA*** NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Funds of Funds Total 0.25%* 0.24*** 0.419 34% 60% 4% 0.11% 0.27*** 0.15*** 0.07** 0.07*** 0.630 26% 66% 6% 
Hedge funds Total 0.48%*** 0.35*** 0.614 32% 64% 3% 0.37%*** 0.37*** 0.19*** 0.06** 0.05*** 0.800 28% 67% 4% 
See Table 6c notes. 
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Table 6c. Performance measurement using the CAPM, Carhart's four-factor model and the combined model - Panel C: The combined model 
 Panel C  
             Alpha dist rib. 
 Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W x US WGcBd Em. Bd High Y Mortg Comm R2adj + 0 - 
Individual funds                
Event driven - Risk Arb 0.39%*** 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.06** 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.04* 0.17*** -0.07 0.03 0.707 37% 59% 2% 
Event driven - Dist. Sec 0.40%*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.11 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.18 0.03 0.693 27% 71% 1% 
Global -0.10% 0.30** 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.18 -0.11 0.14** 0.16 -0.09 0.12** 0.421 9% 81% 9% 
Global Est. 0.56%*** 0.58*** 0.24*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.01 0.03 0.07*** 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.877 26% 71% 2% 
Global Intern. 0.41%*** 0.12** 0.10*** 0.05 0.06** 0.30*** 
-
0.26*** 
0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05* 0.655 28% 67% 4% 
Global Emerging 0.61% 0.31** 0.20** 0.01 0.07 0.34** 
-
0.66*** 
0.22*** 0.18 0.11 0.12* 0.517 15% 84% 0% 
US Opp. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Macro 0.12% 0.25*** 0.13*** 0.01 0.11*** 0.05 -0.14* 0.04 0.05 0.49*** -0.02 0.660 16% 78% 4% 
Market Neutral 0.54%*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.04*** 0.07* 0.11 0.02 0.636 39% 57% 3% 
Long Only Lev. -0.11% 1.01*** 0.38*** -0.08 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.17*** 0.06 0.71** 0.05 0.847 6% 83% 9% 
Sector 0.73%*** 0.84*** 0.43*** 0.02 0.15*** -0.12* 0.03 0.04 -0.11 -0.18 0.06** 0.880 19% 78% 1% 





0.08 -0.07* 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.25* -0.13 0.01 0.775 23% 76% 0% 
No Category 0.33% 0.16 0.25*** -0.01 0.13** 0.26** 0.01 0.18*** -0.20 0.02 0.03 0.435 21% 78% 0% 
Individual Funds Total 0.46%*** 0.34*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.05*** 0.05 -0.10* 0.07*** 0.05 0.05 0.04** 0.862 26% 69% 3% 
Funds of Funds                
Niche 0.24%** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.05* 0.05*** 0.04 -0.07 0.05*** 0.06 -0.10 0.02 0.507 32% 64% 2% 
Diversified 0.10% 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.06 
-
0.17*** 
0.08*** 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.714 24% 71% 3% 
Other NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Funds of Funds Total 0.12% 0.20*** 0.12*** 0.04 0.08*** 0.06 -0.16** 0.07*** 0.07 0.14 0.03 0.701 25% 70% 3% 
Hedge funds Total 0.38%*** 0.31*** 0.16*** 0.03 0.06*** 0.05 -0.11** 0.07*** 0.06 0.07 0.04** 0.841 26% 70% 3% 
This table presents the results of the estimation of the single index model (Panel A), of Carhart's (1997) model (Panel B) and of our combined model (Panel C) for the 01:1994-12:2002 period. We report the OLS 
estimators for equally weigthed portfolios per investment strategy, per type of funds and for all funds. The last column gives the distribution of individually estimated monthly alphas for all funds with 24 monthly data 
or more in a specific investment style. Results for the US Opportunistics and Other categories are not reported as they have, respectively, 0 and 1 living fund in the second subperiod. We report the percentage of 
significantly positive alphas (+), significantly negative alphas (—) and alphas insignificantly different from zero (0) at the 5% level, t-stats are heteroscdasticity consistent. ***Significant at the 1% level, "significant at 
the 5% level and *significant at the 10% level. 
 
Published in : The European Journal of Finance, 2005, vol. 11, n°5, 361-392 
Status : Author’s post-print version 
 
 
Published in : The European Journal of Finance, 2005, vol. 11, n°5, 361-392 
Status : Author’s post-print version 
 
Evidence on alphas obtained in Panel C is not favourable to Funds of Funds and to the Macro strategy. Overall, 
accounting for more risk premia reduces the average reported out-performance by 0.1 % per month. The 
individual alpha distribution shows that taking more factors into account drives down that the proportion of 
individual funds and funds of funds that significantly out-performed the market, and the distribution of 
performance among strategies is also more concentrated. 
Overall it seems that the combined model does a very good job in describing hedge funds behaviour. The 
average R²adj increases from 0.61 for the single factor model, to 0.80 for the four-factor model and to 0.84 for our 
combined model. This coefficient is the best one reported in the literature so far.11 
5.3    Performance Over Bullish and Bearish Subperiods 
In order to analyse the performance components in the bullish and bearish market configurations, we only report 
results for our combined model. Table 7a, b shows the value of the coefficients for the subperiods 01:1994-
03:2000 (Panel A) and 04:2000-12:2002 (Panel B). 
A quick look at the alphas for the considered subperiod clearly indicates that the major part of the performance 
over the total 1994-2002 period is recorded prior March 2000, with the noticeable exception of the Market 
Neutral strategy that sustains positive out-performance for both subperiods. This finding is consistent with the 
result obtained by Liang (2003) who investigates the behaviour of hedge funds strategies using a piecewise 
linear regression setup: Market Neutral funds obtain by far the largest standardized value for alpha, with at the 
same time a very low explanatory power of the regression. 
In contrast, Panel A shows that the Global strategy achieves significant negative performance during the bullish 
period. It is worth reporting that, although nine individual strategies and both funds of funds strategies record a 
negative alpha in Panel B, none of these values are shown to be significant. A look at individual alphas 
reinforces this finding, as the proportion of significantly positive alphas does not significantly differ from the 
total period to the first subperiod, but Panel B shows that 27% of the Market Neutral funds sustain positive out-
performance while on average more than 80% of individual funds managers are in line with the market. 
The strategies followed by funds managers sharply differ from one subperiod to another. All but the No 
Category strategies individual funds significantly follow the market until March 2000; only the Long Only 
Leveraged and the Sectors funds increase their exposure thereafter. The Global, Global International, Market 
Neutral and No Category strategies are not even significantly loaded to the market risk premium. In contrast, the 
Funds of Funds strategies all increase their US stock market exposure after March 2000. 
Some general swings of exposures to several risk factors are observed from one period to another Exposure to 
the World excluding US usually becomes negative, although with low significance levels, in the bearish 
subperiod, except for Global International and Short Sales. On the other, the broadly negative exposure to the 
World Government Bond Index in the first subperiod fades away after March 2000 except for Global and Sector, 
although the Short Sales strategy follows a converse tendency. The loadings for the Emerging Market Bond 
Index and High Yield Bond Index are generally positive in the first and second subperiod, respectively, which 
possibly indicates a broad sliding of bond strategies of hedge funds managers. 
At the individual strategy level, some changes are also of particular interest after March 2000. Event driven 
strategies cease to be momentum-contrarian. All Global strategies increase their investments in small firms and 
reduce their exposures to bond factors; this latter statement also holds for Macro funds. Market Neutral funds 
managers relied more extensively on domestic bond indices. Strikingly, the Short Sales strategy left a pure 
market-contrarian profile for a much broader mix of exposures (positive for HML, World excluding US and 
Commodity Index; negative for SMB, Momentum and World Government Bond Index). 
For Funds of Funds strategies, the noticeable difference is the noticeable reinforcement of the loadings to the 
Momentum factor and the High Yield Bond Index after March 2000, while the exposure to the World 
Government Bond Index goes from very negative to slightly positive. 
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Table 7a. Performance of hedge funds during the bullish and bearish subperiods - Panel A: 01:1994—03:2000 
 Panel A 
             Alpha distrib. 
 Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W xUS WGvBd Em. Bd HighY. Mortg. Comm. R2adj + 0 - 
Individual funds                
RiskArb 0.50%*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.03 -0.07** -0.01 -0.01 0.04** 0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.737 46% 51% 2% 
Dist. Sec 0.50%*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.09** -0.07* 0.11** -0.18** 0.07*** 0.51*** -0.11 0.04 0.809 33% 66% 0% 
Global -0.65%** 0.50*** 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.14 -0.39** 0.08 0.86*** 
-
1.10** 
0.17*** 0.671 9% 81% 9% 
Global Est. 0.62%*** 0.66*** 0.31*** -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.06*** -0.18 -0.01 0.04 0.914 25% 72% 1% 
Global Intern. 0.47%** 0.20** 0.13** 0.00 0.01 0.30*** -0.44*** 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.06 0.664 27% 70% 1% 
Global Emerging 0.27% 0.51*** 0.13 0.09 -0.02 0.36** -0.98*** 0.22** 0.48 -0.71 0.17* 0.558 10% 87% 1% 
US Opp. 0.07% -0.07 0.38** 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.34 0.50 -0.09 0.089 6% 82% 10% 
Macro 0.09% 0.32*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.10** 0.06 -0.32*** 0.04 -0.05 0.53** -0.01 0.695 15% 80% 3% 
Market Neutral 0.53%*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.04*** 0.15* -0.03 0.03* 0.661 39% 59% 1% 
Long Only Lev. 0.03% 1.03*** 0.47*** -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 0.17*** -0.10 0.85* 0.01 0.802 3% 88% 7% 
Sector 0.95%*** 0.82*** 0.52*** 0.03 0.17*** -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.26 0.10 0.07** 0.899 25% 74% 0% 





0.08 -0.05 -0.07 0.09 -0.06 0.33 -0.43 -0.04 0.711 17% 82% 0% 
No Category 0.25% 0.26* 0.36*** -0.13 0.03 0.34*** -0.06 0.19*** -0.48 0.22 0.04 0.509 31% 68% 0% 
Individual Funds 
Total 
0.44%*** 0.41*** 0.20*** 0.03 0.04 0.06* -0.17*** 0.06*** 0.03 -0.05 0.05** 0.893 26% 70% 2% 
Funds of Funds                
Niche 0.22% 0.17*** 0.08** 0.10** 0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.05** 0.12 -0.30 0.01 0.507 35% 60% 3% 
Diversified 0.02% 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.06 0.08** 0.06 -0.28*** 0.08*** 0.16 -0.06 0.03 0.763 21% 73% 4% 
Other 0.24% 0.24*** 0.11** 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.19 0.02 0.32* -0.06 0.03 0.485 18% 77% 4% 
Funds of Funds Total 0.05% 0.27*** 0.12*** 0.07 0.07* 0.06 -0.26*** 0.07*** 0.15 -0.06 0.03 0.750 23% 71% 4% 
Hedge Funds Total 0.35%*** 0.38*** 0.18*** 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.19*** 0.07*** 0.06 -0.06 0.04** 0.874 46% 51% 2% 
See Table 7b notes. 
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Table 7b. Performance of hedge funds during the bullish and bearish subperiods - Panel B: 04:2000-12:2002 
 Panel B 
             
Alpha distrib. 
 
 Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W x US 
W Gv 
Bd 
Em. Bd High Y. Mortg. Comm. R2adj + 0 — 
Individual funds                
Risk Arb -0.12% 0.17** 0.12*** 0.08** -0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.23*** 0.19 0.03 0.863 7% 91% 0% 
Dist. Sec -0.01% 0.22* 0.18*** 0.01 0.02 -0.16 0.10 0.12** 0.22*** 0.04 -0.05* 0.740 13% 86% 0% 
Global -0.12% 0.36 0.29* 0.16 -0.08 -0.08 0.71* 0.27 -0.15 -0.56 0.02 0.265 0% 100% 0% 
Global Est. -0.19% 0.45*** 0.15*** 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.08 0.06 0.14** 0.38* -0.01 0.945 5% 89% 5% 
Global Intern. -0.02% 0.06 0.12*** 0.08 0.03 0.25** 0.00 -0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.783 9% 87% 3% 
Global Emerging 0.25% 0.49** 0.31*** 0.06 0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.04 0.21 0.08 -0.04 0.707 15% 80% 4% 
US Opp. NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Macro -0.25% 0.27** 0.14** 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.23 0.07 0.06 0.44 -0.05 0.650 6% 85% 7% 
Market Neutral 0.37%*** 0.06 0.05** 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.10*** 0.25* -0.01 0.688 27% 68% 3% 
Long Only Lev. -0.50% 1.14*** 0.18* -0.19 -0.03 -0.44** 0.27 0.13 0.24 0.75 0.06 0.915 0% 95% 4% 
Sector -0.19% 0..97*** 0.26*** -0.02 0.08** 
-
0.44*** 
0.34** 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.915 6% 89% 3% 






0.38** -0.39* -0.05 0.09 0.66 0.11** 0.900 0% 90% 9% 
No Category -0.05% 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.12*** -0.05 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.05 0.427 0% 100% 0% 
Individual Funds 
Total 
0.03% 0.32*** 0.14*** 0.02 0.02 -0.09* 0.06 0.03 0.12*** 0.24 -0.01 0.947 13% 82% 4% 
Funds of Funds                
Niche -0.05% 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.05* 0.02* -0.11** 0.08 -0.01 0.08** 0.04 0.01 0.761 14% 80% 4% 
Diversified -0.13% 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.02 0.04*** -0.06 0.10* 0.01 0.10*** 0.09 0.00 0.889 10% 81% 7% 
Other A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Funds of Funds Total -0.12% 0.19*** 
0.11 
*** 
0.03 0.04*** -0.07 0.10* 0.00 0.10* 0.08 0.00 0.883 11% 81% 7% 
Hedge Funds Total -0.01% 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.03** -0.09* 0.07 0.02 0.12*** 0.20 0.00 0.943 13% 82% 4% 
This table presents the results of the estimation of our combined model for the 01:1994-03:2000 (Panel A) and the 04:2000-12:2002 (Panel B) subperiods. We report the OLS estimators for equally weigthed portfolios 
per investment strategy, per type of funds and for all funds. The last column gives the distribution of individually estimated monthly alphas for all funds with 24 monthly data or more in a specific investment style. In 
Panel B, results for the US Opportunistics and Other categories are not reported as they have, respectively, 0 and 1 living fund in the second subperiod. We report the percentage of significantly positive alphas (+), 
significantly negative alphas (—) and alphas insignificantly different from zero (0) at the 5% level, (-stats are heteroscedasticity consistent. ***Significant at the 1% level, "significant at the 5% level and *significant at 
the 10% level. 
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6.    Persistence in Performance 
Our results show significant evidence of superior performance over the total period of time for most individual 
strategies. Nevertheless, results are mostly due to the first, bullish subperiod and the positive out-performance 
tends to fade away after March 2000. Nevertheless, active hedge funds selection strategies are likely to increase 
the expected return if performance is persistent, i.e. if a superior average return in a period is likely to be 
followed by a superior average return in the next period for a given fund. Sirri and Tufano (1998) document 
large inflows of money into last years best performers, and withdrawals from last years' losers. Zheng (1999) 
finds that newly invested money in these best performing mutual funds is a predictor of future performance. This 
indicates that persistence in performance is critical for mutual funds. 
This is all the more important given that we have found in the previous subsection a substantial break in 
performance at the peak of the stock markets. Is persistence sustainable over the total period, or is it likely to be 
observed only in a particular subperiod? 
6.1   Persistence Over the Total Period 
We follow the methodology of Carhart (1997) using our combined model. All funds are ranked based on their 
previous year total return. Every January, we put all funds into 10 equally weighted portfolios, ordered from 
highest to lowest past returns. Portfolios 1 (High) and 10 (Low) are then further subdivided on the same 
measure. The portfolios are held till the following January and then rebalanced again. Funds that disappear 
during the course of the year are included in the equally-weighted average until their death, then portfolio 
weights are readjusted appropriately. This yields a time series of monthly returns on each decile portfolio from 
01:1995 to 12:2002 (Table 8). 
The monthly average return to the strategy of investing in portfolios 1 and 10 would have been, respectively, 
1.07% and 0.44% for the total period. 
The monthly excess returns on the decile portfolios decrease monotonically between portfolio D1 and D8, but 
the subdecile D10c obtains an excess return higher than 1%, slightly significant. The spreads between decile 
excess returns are not significant. Cross-sectional variation in returns is considerably larger for the extreme 
deciles than for the middle deciles, in line with the results of Brown et al. (2001) and Capocci and Hübner 
(2004). 
After controlling for the risk factors, the picture is dramatically altered. The D10c portfolio, i.e. the extreme 
losers, enjoy a remarkable monthly out-performance of 1.77%.12 The 1a-10c spread goes from an insignificant 
0.05% to a significant -1.6%. Aside from this extreme value, significant alphas are mostly to be found in the 
middle deciles, with the most significant values (at 1% level) being observed in portfolios D4 to D8. 
The pattern of loading to risk premia suggests that past winners more closely follow the market, invest more in 
small firms and in emerging bond markets but less in the world stock index than past losers. Quite naturally 
given the definition of the portfolios, past winners follow momentum strategies while past losers are momentum-
contrarian. 
In the middle deciles, where performance seems to be persistent when accounting for risk, we notice that these 
strategies are usually characterized by positive exposure to the HML factor (value strategy), negative exposure to 
the world bond index but positive exposure to the emerging bond markets, indicating arbitraging strategies on 
geographical bond markets. This is a possible source for their sustained performance. 
6.2   Persistence Over the Subperiods 
The same analysis as before is performed in Table 9a, b for the bullish (Panel A) and for the bearish (Panel B) 
subperiods.13 
Panel A of Table 9 displays, not surprisingly, very comparable results with the ones of Table 8, but there are 
some important differences. First, the alpha for portfolio D10c is not significant anymore; only middle-decile 
portfolios have a significant alpha. This result is consistent with Capocci and Hiibner (2004) that analyse the 
01:1994-06:2000 period. There is no significant spread between decile portfolio returns. 
Loading to individual factors are to a large extent similar for stock indices, but not at all for bond indices. During 
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the bullish period, past winners have not invested in any bond index, and even heavily divested from the world 
bond index. In contrast, they have also significant loadings with respect to the commodity index. At the same 
time, past average performers were mostly invested in the high yield bond market. 
Unfortunately, Panel B indicates that there is no evidence of persistence in good performance during the bearish 
period. The only sustained performance is the negative one, as past losers are found to persistently aggravate 
their losses in portfolios D10, D10a and D10b. This finding is in line with our analysis of survivorship biases, 
reinforcing the conjecture that there was a particularly high mortality rate after March 2000 due to poor 
performance of the disappeared funds. 
Top decile portfolios during that period had positive loadings in high yield bonds and in the Momentum factor, 
but negative loadings in the commodity market and the HML factor. The losing strategies, i.e. the ones 
persistently followed by bottom decile portfolios, had loading of opposite signs on the same factors and, 
additionally, very high loadings on the mortgage market. 
We also notice that, contrarily to the 'conventional wisdom' concerning the correlation between the momentum 
factor and hedge funds performance during bearish periods, past winners consistently invested in momentum 
strategies and past winners consistently followed contrarian strategies after March 2000. The paradox is only 
illusory, as past winners typically hold winner stocks in their portfolio and are thus naturally positively exposed 
to the momentum factor with these securities. Our results simply suggest that these funds managers did not 
actively manage this particular component of their portfolio. 
6.3   Analysis of the Market Neutral Strategy 
This subsection focuses on the persistence in returns for the only hedge funds strategy that has been found to 
provide significant abnormal returns for both subperiods in the previous section, namely the Market Neutral 
strategy. We determine whether persistence in returns exists for this strategy for the whole period as well as for 
the subperiods. As for the total sample, we classify funds in 10 decile portfolios, with the top and bottom decile 
divided in 3. Table 10a-c reports our results for these strategies. 
Panel A reports the results of the analysis for the global period. They show that there is no significant difference 
between good and bad performing funds. All alphas but the one of portfolio D10c are significantly positive for 
the whole period, although the significance level is lower for the extreme subdeciles. Compared to our results for 
the whole database, excess returns are higher for the extreme deciles and smaller for middle deciles; however, 
returns of Market Neutral funds exhibit a much lower variance, and higher alphas for the top deciles (from D1 to 
D5). In a nutshell, all but the poorest past performers exhibit a significant persistence in performance. The 
review of risk coefficients shows that, aside from the fact that past best performers had a significant loading on 
the stock market index and on the SMB factor while past losers had a greater focus on world stock markets, no 
other clear pattern emerges. 
Panels B and C display very different pictures. During the 1994-March 2000 period, only the alphas of top decile 
funds were systematically higher than for the whole period. In contrast, the lowest decile funds did not out-
perform the market. Middle decile funds had a clearer focus on high yield bond markets. 
Panel C shows that the persistence in performance during the market collapse was clearly sustained for portfolios 
D2 to D6, with high significance levels. These funds had no particularly remarkable investment pattern, except 
for the median decile (D4) whose loadings are significant for the High Yield factor (positive) and for the World 
Government Bond and Momentum factors (negative), with a relatively high adjusted R2 of 57.8%. 
Since these decile portfolios had significant alphas for the first subperiod too, this indicates that the superior 
performance of these funds was predictable irrespective of the prevailing market conditions. We view this as a 
major result considering that Market Neutral funds have traditionally been assigned the role of protecting 
investors against negative market twists: this reinforces this claims on a double dimension, as our results suggest 
that this performance is not only sustained during positive or negative market conditions, but during both; 
however, persistence in performance is observable for the medium-to-top past performers only, showing that 
only a very targeted investment behaviour in Market Neutral funds would provide a sustained positive abnormal 
return. 
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Table 8. Hedge funds persistence based on 12 month lagged returns 
Portfolio Exc. return St. dev Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W x US WGvBd Em. Bd 
High 
Y. 
Mortg. Comm. R2 adj 
Dla 1.12%* 6.63% 0.17% 0.64*** 0.63*** -0.04 0.36*** 0.14 -0.56** 0.19** 0.07 0.51 0.13** 0.768 
Dlb 1.10%** 4.75% 0.38% 0.57*** 0.40*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.05 -0.19 0.11* 0.16 -0.06 0.07 0.768 
D1c 0.97%** 3.97% 0.47%** 0.43*** 0.35*** -0.02 0.20*** 0.07 -0.15 0.08* 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.776 
Dl 1.07%** 5.00% 0.34% 0.55*** 0.46*** -0.01 0.28*** 0.08 -0.29* 0.12** 0.12 0.15 0.07* 0.802 
D2 0.86%*** 3.27% 0.32%* 0.48*** 0.28*** 0.04 0.20*** -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.08 -0.20 0.04 0.813 
D3 0.78%*** 2.42% 0.31%** 0.37*** 0.19*** 0.07** 0.11*** 0.01 -0.07 0.07** 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.787 
D4 0.71%*** 2.10% 0.36%*** 0.31*** 0.13*** 0.07** 0.08*** 0.04 -0.13* 0.06** 0.05 0.05 0.04* 0.750 
D5 0.61%*** 1.69% 0.35%*** 0.26*** 0.09*** 0.05* 0.05*** 0.01 -0.05 0.05** 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.700 
D6 0.50%*** 1.33% 0.28%*** 0.20*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.03** 0.02 -0.09** 0.05*** 0.08* 0.07 0.02 0.773 
D7 0.45%*** 1.37% 0.30%*** 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.10** 0.04*** 0.05 0.05 0.03* 0.744 
D8 0.46%*** 1.67% 0.40%*** 0.11*** 0 09*** -0.01 -0.02 0.11 *** -0.18*** 0.06** 0.08 0.15 0.05** 0.698 
D9 0.31% 2.34% 0.34%** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.02 -0.10*** 0.19*** -0.23*** 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.733 
D10 0.44% 3.95% 0.72%** 0.22* 0.05 -0.04 -0.19*** 0.28** -0.29 0.04 0.12 -0.15 0.08 0.558 
D10a 0.54% 3.36% 0.53%** 0.28*** 0.09* 0.00 -0.13*** 0.22** -0.02 0.09* 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.602 
D10b 0.03% 4.03% 0.29% 0.27** 0.04 -0.01 -0.14*** 0.29** -0.32* 0.03 0.09 -0.41 0.07 0.556 
D10C 1.07%* 5.65% 1.77%*** 0.07 0.03 -0.13 -0.32*** 0.35* -0.53* -0.02 0.25 -0.26 0.10 0.359 
1-10 spread 0.63% 5.03% -0.38% 0.33** 0.41*** 0.03 0.47*** -0.20 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.515 
la-l0c spread 0.05% 7.71% -1.60%** 0.58** 0.60*** 0.09 0.67*** -0.21 -0.03 0.21 -0.19 0.76 0.03 0.481 
1-2 spread 0.21% 2.12% 0.02% 0.07 0.18*** -0.04 0.08*** 0.12* -0.27*** 0.07* 0.04 0.35 0.03 0.539 
9-10 spread -0.13% 2.17% -0.38% -0.04 0.03 0.06 0.09** -0.09 0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.27 -0.04 0.182 
This table reports the result of the estimation of our combined model for the 01:1994-12:2002 period. Each year, all funds are ranked based on their previous year's return. Portfolios are equally weighted and weights 
are readjusted whenever a fund disappears. Funds with the highest previous year's return go into portfolio Dl and funds with the lowest go into portfolio D10. Monthly Exc Return is the Monthly Excess Return of the 
portfolio, Std. Dev. is the Standard Deviation of the Monthly Excess Return. All numbers in the table are monthly percentage. ***Significant at the 1% level, "significant at the 5% level and *significant at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 9a. Hedge funds persistence during the bullish and bearish subperiods - Panel A: 01:1994—03:2000 




St. dev Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W x US W Gv Bd Em. Bd High Y. Mortg. Comm. 
R2 
adj 
Dla 2.09%** 6.85% 0.17% 0.69*** 0.70*** -0.07 0.34*** 0.25 -0 94*** 0.15 -0.56 1.18 0.27*** 0.779 
Dlb 1.87%*** 4.46% 0.46% 0.62*** 0.41*** 0.19** 0.28*** 0.18* -0.40** 0.05 -0.28 -0.03 0.15*** 0.835 
D1c 1.68%*** 3.97% 0.55%** 0.48*** 0.41*** -0.01 0.17** 0.16* -0.43*** 0.05 -0.18 0.41 0.10** 0.812 
Dl 1.89%*** 4.97% 0.40% 0.60*** 0.51*** 0.04 0.26*** 0.19* -0.58*** 0.08 -0.35 0.51 0.17*** 0.837 
D2 1.44%*** 3.27% 0.41%** 0.57*** 0.32*** 0.13** 0.13*** 0.06 -0.21** 0.02 -0.05 -0.32 0.06* 0.885 
D3 1.15%*** 2.56% 0.30%** 0.46*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.06* 0.06 -0.21*** 0.05** 0.11 -0.16 0.04 0.889 
D4 1.08%*** 2.35% 0.31%** 0.39*** 0.14*** 0.09** 0.05 0.05 -0.22*** 0.05** 0.29*** -0.29 0.06** 0.879 
D5 0.90%*** 1.89% 0.28%** 0.35*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.05** 0.35*** -0.50*** 0.01 0.831 
D6 0.75%*** 1.45% 0.27%*** 0.24*** 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.02 0.02 -0.10* 0.05*** 0.20*** -0.07 0.02 0.845 
D7 0.76%*** 1.45% 0.36%*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.14** 0.05*** 0.16** 0.00 0.01 0.835 
D8 0.76%*** 1.67% 0.42%*** 0.13** 0.11*** -0.05 -0.04 0.12** -0.23*** 0.07*** 0.06 0.27 0.06** 0.697 
D9 0.67%** 2.08% 0.28% 0.21*** 0.08* -0.08 -0.09** 0.17*** -0.31*** 0.06* -0.01 0.25 0.04 0.672 
D10 0.97%** 3.60% 0.41% 0.32** 0.00 -0.15 -0.06 0.17 -0.24 0.07 0.45 -0.78 0.07 0.458 
D10a 1.01%** 3.18% 0.43% 0.35*** 0.09 -0.12 -0.14* 0.17 0.05 0.11* 0.23 -0.23 -0.02 0.569 
D10b 0.77%* 3.54% 0.27% 0.25 0.04 -0.11 -0.02 0.23 -0.30 0.05 0.36 -0.63 0.06 0.397 
D10C 1.37%** 5.35% 0.75% 0.39 -0.17 -0.24 0.02 0.09 -0.47 0.03 0.75 -1.78 0.17 0.264 
1-10 spread 0.92%* 4.32% -0.01% 0.28 0.51*** 0.19 0.33*** 0.03 -0.33 0.01 -0.79** 1.29* 0.10 0.539 
la-10c spread 0.71% 7.11% -0.59% 0.30 0.87*** 0.17 0.32 0.16 -0.47 0.12 -1.30* 2.97** 0.10 0.412 
1-2 spread 0.45% 2.19% -0.01% 0.03 0.19*** -0.08 0.13** 0.14* -0.37*** 0.06 -0.30 0.83** 0.11*** 0.549 
9-10 spread -0.30% 2.22% -0.13% -0.11 0.08 0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.46 1.03* -0.03 0.088 
See Table 9b notes. 
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Table 9b. Hedge funds persistence during the bullish and bearish subperiods - Panel B: 04:2000-12:2002 




St. dev Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W x US 
W Gv 
Bd 
Em. Bd High Y. Mortg. Comm. R2 adj 
D1a -0.73% 5.83% 0.16% 0.46* 0.33** -0.29* 0.40*** 0.02 -0.15 0.21 0.54*** 0.40 -0.11 0.848 
D1b -0.37% 5.01% 0.61% 0.28 0.14 -0.36** 0.38*** 0.04 -0.15 0.30** 0.65*** 0.19 -0.13** 0.819 
D1c -0.37% 3.67% 0.26% 0.33* 0.18** -0.19* 0.21*** -0.09 0.20 0.09 0.43*** -0.16 -0.10** 0.811 
D1 -0.49% 4.74% 0.34% 0.36* 0.22** -0.28** 0.33*** -0.01 -0.03 0.20* 0.54*** 0.14 -0.12** 0.862 
D2 -0.25% 3.03% 0.05% 0.37*** 0.14** -0.15** 0.22*** -0.19 0.17 0.12* 0.33*** 0.03 -0.07** 0.879 
D3 0.05% 1.95% 0.12% 0.30*** 0.12*** -0.04 0.11*** -0.16* 0.14 0.03 0.19*** 0.14 -0.04* 0.847 
D4 0.02% 1.30% -0.02% 0.27*** 0.11*** 0.05 0.05*** -0.12** 0.11* 0.02 0.07 0.10 -0.03* 0.855 
D5 0.06% 1.03% 0.08% 0.20*** 0.09*** 0.03 0.02* -0.10** 0.07 -0.01 0.09** 0.00 -0.01 0.846 
D6 0.03% 0.93% 0.04% 0.15*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.09*** 0.05 0.00 0.838 
D7 -0.12% 0.97% 0.01% 0.14** 0.06** 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.772 
D8 -0.13% 1.55% 0.06% 0.14 0.12** 0.04 -0.05** 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.705 
D9 -0.38% 2.68% -0.31% 0.38*** 0.19*** 0.23*** -0.17*** 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.30 0.05 0.839 
D10 -0.56% 4.42% -0.91%* 0.72*** 0.23** 0.42*** -0.43*** -0.13 0.23 -0.07 -0.32** 1.09* 0.16*** 0.835 
D10a -0.34% 3.56% -0.88%* 0.69*** 0.28*** 0.40*** -0.28*** -0.12 0.16 -0.03 -0.27* 1.25** 0.11** 0.771 
D10b -1.40%* 4.56% -1.36%** 0.89*** 0.14 0.42*** -0.36*** -0.20 0.26 -0.07 -0.33* 0.54 0.18** 0.778 
D10C 0.50% 6.23% -0.13% 0.50 0.33* 0.46** -0.71*** -0.02 0.27 -0.12 -0.33 1.61 0.17* 0.760 




1a-10c spread -1.22% 8.71% 0.30% -0.04 0.00 -0.75*** 0.10*** 0.04 -0.42 0.34 0.87** -1.22 -0.28** 0.749 
1-2 spread -0.24% 1.93% 0.29% -0.01 0.07 -0.13* 0.11*** 0.18 -0.20 0.08 0.21** 0.11 -0.05 0.660 
9-10 spread 0.18% 2.07% 0.60%* -0.33*** -0.04 
—
0.19*** 




This table reports the result of the estimation of our combined model for the 01:1994-03:2000 (Panel A) and the 04:2000-12:2002 (Panel B) subperiods. Each year, all funds are ranked based on their previous year's 
return. Portfolios are equally weighted and weights are readjusted whenever a fund disappears. Funds with the highest previous year's return go into portfolio D1 and funds with the lowest go into portfolio D10. 
Monthly Exc Return is the Monthly Excess Return of the portfolio, Std. Dev. is the Standard Deviation of the Monthly Excess Return. All numbers in the table are monthly percentage. ***Significant at the 1% level. 
"Significant at the 5% level. *Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 10a. Hedge funds persistence for the Market Neutral strategy - Panel A: 01:1994-12:2002 




St. dev Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W xUS W Gv Bd Em. Bd 
High 
Y. 
Mortg. Comm. R2 adj 
D1a 1.44%*** 3.75% 0.93%** 0.28* 0.25*** 0.14 0.17*** 0.04 -0.16 -0.04 0.16 0.36 0.01 0.284 
D1b 1.43%*** 3.50% 1.08%*** 0.40*** 0.11 0.12 0.10 -0.21 0.21 0.12 0.18 -0.92* 0.06 0.129 
D1c 1.30%*** 2.55% 0.92%*** 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.521 
Dl 1.37%*** 2.59% 0.97%*** 0.30*** 0.17*** 0.09 0.16*** -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.13 -0.22 0.03 0.436 
D2 1.16%*** 1.74% 1.01%*** 0.16** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.03 0.07 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.330 
D3 0.81%*** 1.12% 0.61%*** 0.17*** 0.06*** 0.06** 0.03* -0.05 -0.03 0.06*** 0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.437 
D4 0.66%*** 1.30% 0.54%*** 0.05 0.09*** 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.17** 0.02 0.17** 0.17 0.00 0.273 
D5 0.54%*** 0.99% 0.44%*** 0.04 0.06*** 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.07*** 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.333 
D6 0.45%*** 0.80% 0.33%*** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.04** 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.05*** 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.433 
D7 0.31%*** 0.74% 0.25%*** 0.03 0.04*** 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.11*** 0.03** 0.07* 0.16* 0.00 0.403 
D8 0.41%*** 0.86% 0.42%*** -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.08*** -0.13*** 0.03** 0.08* 0.07 0.02 0.383 
D9 0.50%*** 1.44% 0.48%*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.12** -0.10 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.05* 0.269 
D10 0.69%*** 2.40% 0.64%*** 0.05 0.10** -0.02 -0.12*** 0.16** -0.12 0.06 0.15 0.64** 0.01 0.424 
D10a 0.56%** 2.51% 0.58%*** -0.15* 0.07 -0.09 -0.07** 0.33*** -0.21 0.19*** 0.21* 0.65** -0.01 0.484 
D10b 0.45% 3.00% 0.43% 0.06 0.14** 0.04 -0.16*** 0.18* -0.26 0.10 0.16 0.63 -0.04 0.366 
D10C 1.14%*** 4.18% 0.84%* 0.37** 0.10 0.07 -0.20*** -0.13 0.24 -0.11 0.04 0.89 0.08 0.196 
1-10 spread 0.69%** 3.18% 0.34% 0.25* 0.07 0.10 0.28*** -0.21* 0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.86* 0.02 0.233 
1a-10c spread 0.30% 5.30% 0.08% -0.09 0.15 0.07 0.36*** 0.17 -0.40 0.08 0.12 -0.53 -0.07 0.141 
1-2 spread 0.21% 2.31% -0.04% 0.14 0.04 -0.06 0.13*** -0.12 0.10 0.05 0.17 -0.17 0.00 0.103 
9-10 spread -0.19% 1.97% -0.16% -0.06 -0.10** 0.02 0.09** -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.42 0.03 0.144 
See Table 10c notes. 
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Table 10b. Hedge funds persistence for the Market Neutral strategy - Panel B: 01:1994-03:2000 




St. dev Alpha Mkt SMB HML PR1YR W x US 
W Gv 
Bd 
Em. Bd High Y. Mortg. Comm. R2  adj 
D1a 2.17%*** 3.5% 1.41%*** 0.22 0.32*** 0.04 0.27** 0.02 -0.18 -0.10 -0.46 1.08 0.14* 0.391 
D1b 2.01%*** 3.2% 1.67%*** 0.37** 0.19* 0.06 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.33 -0.06 0.11 0.106 
D1c 1.79%*** 2.6% 1.01%*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.02 0.23*** 0.07 -0.25 -0.01 -0.31 0.19 0.08 0.605 
D1 1.97%*** 2.4% 1.34%*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.04 0.13* 0.00 -0.17 -0.03 -0.38 0.35 0.10** 0.501 
D2 1.30%*** 2.0% 0.99%*** 0.28*** 0.15*** 0.22*** -0.01 0.10 -0.21 -0.04 -0.07 -0.36 0.01 0.472 
D3 0.97%*** 1.2% 0.54%*** 0.25*** 0.07** 0.11*** 0.04 -0.09** 0.02 0.07*** 0.23** -0.41** -0.01 0.590 
D4 0.79%*** 1.5% 0.59%*** 0.07 0.08* 0.12** 0.04 -0.07 -0.13 0.03 0.51*** -0.23 -0.01 0.338 
D5 0.62%*** 1.1% 0.40%*** 0.04 0.06* 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.08*** 0.29** -0.07 0.01 0.387 
D6 0.55%*** 0.8% 0.35%*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.06** -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.05*** 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.509 
D7 0.38%*** 0.7% 0.27%*** 0.01 0.04** 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 0.04*** 0.23*** 0.12 0.01 0.520 
D8 0.58%*** 0.8% 0.46%*** 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.11* 0.05** 0.20** 0.00 0.04** 0.477 
D9 0.64%*** 1.5% 0.47%*** 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.09 -0.11 0.05 0.38** -0.13 0.07** 0.420 
D10 0.86%*** 2.2% 0.63%* -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.44 0.22 0.03 0.153 
DlOa 0.70%** 2.4% 0.50%* -0.14 -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 0.27*** -0.11 0.22*** 0.39 0.14 0.01 0.425 
DlOb 0.68%** 2.6% 0.34% 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.14** 0.58* 0.47 0.01 0.163 
D10C 1.31%** 4.3% 1.10%* 0.28 0.01 0.25 -0.17 -0.07 0.29 -0.14 0.41 0.03 0.08 0.042 
1-10 spread 1.11%*** 3.0% 0.71%* 0.31** 0.19** 0.07 0.18* -0.13 -0.22 -0.10 -0.81** 0.13 0.07 0.243 
la-10c spread 0.86% 5.4% 0.31% -0.07 0.31* -0.20 0.44** 0.09 -0.47 0.04 -0.87 1.05 0.06 0.182 
1-2 spread 0.67%** 2.2% 0.36% 0.02 0.08 -0.18* 0.14* -0.09 0.04 0.01 -0.31 0.71 0.09 0.074 
9-10 spread -0.22% 1.9% -0.16% 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.16 -0.03 -0.06 -0.35 0.04 -0.105 
See Table 10c notes. 
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Table 10c. Hedge funds persistence for the Market Neutral strategy - Panel C: 04:2000-12:2002 









Em. Bd High Y. Mortg. Comm. R2 adj 
Dla 0.05% 3.71% 0.05% -0.16 0.01 0.00 0.16* 0.55 -0.48 0.36* 0.40 1.74* -0.12 0.299 
Dlb 0.32% 3.78% 0.79% -0.06 0.09 -0.09 0.23** 0.03 -0.04 0.38* 0.50 -1.08 -0.13 0.129 
Die 0.37% 2.15% -0.02% 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.12** -0.14 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.56 -0.05 0.427 
Dl 0.24% 2.51% 0.25% 0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.17*** 0.13 -0.10 0.27** 0.36** 0.40 -0.10* 0.460 
D2 0.91%*** 0.78% 0.72%*** 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.29 0.01 0.192 
D3 0.51%*** 0.64% 0.62%*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.12** -0.02 0.00 0.130 
D4 0.42%*** 0.73% 0.49%*** -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.10 -0.03 0.13*** 0.17 0.02 0.585 
D5 0.38%*** 0.57% 0.51%*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.09* -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.491 
D6 0.25%*** 0.55% 0.35%** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.08 0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.160 
D7 0.17% 0.77% 0.31%* 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 0.07 -0.08 -0.02 0.353 
D8 0.07% 0.73% 0.05% -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.03* 0.06 -0.12 -0.07** 0.06 0.18 -0.02 0.439 
D9 0.23% 1.24% -0.22% 0.11 0.10 0.15** -0.08** 0.00 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.70* 0.00 0.164 
D10 0.36% 2.68% -0.25% 0.49*** 0.28*** 0.25*** -0.18*** -0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 1.37*** 0.03 0.844 
D10a 0.29% 2.71% -0.19% 0.17 0.28*** 0.16 -0.11** 0.15 -0.20 0.04 0.01 1.51*** -0.01 0.600 
D10b 0.02% 3.58% -0.27% 0.44** 0.36*** 0.38*** -0.26*** 0.02 -0.39* -0.03 -0.24* 0.83 0.07 0.794 
D10C 0.83% 3.98% -0.49% 1.04*** 0.26 0.25 -0.24*** -0.71** 0.52 -0.15 -0.19 2.16** 0.05 0.505 
1-10 spread -0.12% 3.33% 0.50% -0.48* -0.21 -0.28* 0.35*** 0.26 -0.04 0.33** 0.47** -0.97 -0.13* 0.527 
1a-10c spread -0.78% 4.95% 0.54% -1.21** -0.26 -0.25 0.39*** 1.26** -1.00* 0.51* 0.58 -0.42 -0.17 0.224 
1-2 spread -0.67%* 2.23% -0.47% -0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.17*** 0.17 -0.12 0.29** 0.26 0.11 -0.11* 0.362 
9-10 spread -0.12% 2.06% 0.03% -0.38*** -0.18*** -0.10 0.11*** 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.09 -0.67** -0.04 0.784 
This table reports the result of the estimation of our combined model for the Market Neutral strategy 01:1994-03:2002 (Panel A) period, and the 01:1994-03:2000 (Panel B) and 04:2000-12:2002 (Panel C) subperiods. 
Each year, all funds are ranked based on their previous year's return. Portfolios are equally weighted and weights are readjusted whenever a fund disappears. Funds with the highest previous year's return go into 
portfolio Dl and funds with the lowest go into portfolio D10. Monthly Exc Return is the Monthly Excess Return of the portfolio, Std. Dev. is the Standard Deviation of the Monthly Excess Return. All numbers in the 
table are monthly percentage. ***Significant at the 1% level, "significant at the 5% level and *significant at the 10% level. 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that the poor adjustment of the model for the best performing decile portfolios 
during the down market period also signals that these fund managers tended to pursue very active and moving 
investment strategies, placing great importance on market timing and tactical allocation. The alternative 
explanation of missing risk factors, which is also reported in Liang (2003), although theoretically possible, is not 
very compelling given the proven very high accuracy of our combined model. However, this particular aspect 
opens the way to additional research on hedge funds performance and persistence during unfavourable market 
conditions. 
7.    Conclusions 
The evolution of financial markets during the 1994-2002 period has been very rich in significant up and down 
market movements whose length and severity have been largely unprecedented. In this paper, we have seized 
this opportunity to test whether hedge funds displayed significantly different patterns of performance levels and 
persistence during this time window as well as in undoubtedly bullish and bearish market situations. 
First, our database constituted of 2894 funds obtained fromMAR proved to be fairly trustworthy with respect to 
the most important biases in hedge funds studies, namely the survivorship and instant return history biases 
despite the high attrition rate of funds observed after March 2000. Our original ten-factor composite performance 
model also raises little suspicion concerning its ability to explain returns as we achieve very high significance 
levels with very little correlation among regressors. 
The analysis of performance indicates that most hedge funds significantly out-performed the market during the 
whole test period, but this is mostly due to the bullish subperiod. The pattern is somehow attenuated for funds of 
funds strategies. In contrast, no significant underperformance of individual hedge funds of funds of funds 
strategies is observed when markets headed south. The Market Neutral strategy provides a noticeable exception, 
however, as is sustains abnormal performance over both the bullish and the bearish subperiods. 
Persistence analysis also indicates that most of the predictability of superior performance is to be found prior to 
March 2000. Our results confirm several previous studies that found that persistence, if any, is mostly located 
among medium performers. In the second subperiod, only negative persistence can be found among the past 
losers, suggesting that bad performance has probably been the decisive factor for hedge funds mortality. 
Our analysis of the performance of the Market Neutral strategy is remarkably encouraging and is confirmed and 
refined with the persistence analysis: for portfolios that were between the 20% and 69% best performers in this 
category, abnormal performance and persistence are pervasive throughout the subperiods, probably thanks to an 
extreme adaptability and a very active investment behaviour. 
Obviously, these very appealing results call for a much more detailed analysis of the Market Neutral strategy 
among individual hedge funds. Market timing issues do matter for their risk exposure, and traditional asset 
pricing models may not fully account for their highly unstable investment strategies. We believe that this paper 
potentially opens the way to a deeper examination of the properties of these particular hedge funds during 
negative market conditions, but this particular field of investigation is left for future theoretical as well as 
empirical research. 
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Notes 
1   See Fama and French (1993) for a precise description of the construction of SMBt and HMLt. 
2  For a description of the construction of PR1YR see Carhart (1997). 
3  The Lehman US Aggregate Bond Index, that was used in several previous hedge funds studies, was found to 
have an extremely high correlation with the Lehman BBA Corporate Bond Index and thus was removed from 
our study. Agarwal and Naik (2004) suggest that the Goldman Sachs Commodity index is a better approximation 
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of the commodity market than the Gold index regarding hedge funds.  
The three databases have never been used together in a study, but Ackermann and Ravenscraft (1998) and 
Ackermann et al. (1999) and Capocci and Hiibner (2004) used a combination of HFR and MAR while Liang 
(2000) uses a combination of TASS and HFR. 
6  This strategy has been suppressed in 1999. 
7   See Capocci and Hübner (2004) for more a complete analysis of this correlation. 
8   Detailed data is available upon request. 
9  This consensus value quite high when compared to the 0.8-1.5 bias reported by Brown and Goetzmann (1995) 
for US mutual funds. 
10  To make individual estimation, we require all funds to have consecutive monthly return history for at least 24 
months, so that relatively accurate risk measures can be estimated. 
11   See Liang (1999) and Amin and Kat (2003). 
12  The poor value of the adjusted R2 for this decile portfolio suggests however a very unstable behaviour of 
individual funds returns inside this decile portfolio. 
13  For the second subperiod, we used returns from the 04:1999-03:2000 period to form the first decile portfolios. 
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